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Kingsbury: Kingsbury: Must We Talk about That Reasonable Accommodation

"Must We Talk About that Reasonable
Accommodation?": The Eighth Circuit Says
Yes, But is the Answer Reasonable?
Fjellestadv. Pizza Hut ofAmerica, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1990, when Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), 2 an estimated forty-three million Americans had one or more physical
or mental disabilities.3 Unfortunately, many Americans with disabilities
experience various forms of discrimination including outright intentional
exclusion.4 Title I of the ADA is designed to address employment
discrimination and requires covered employers to make reasonable
accommodations to the known physical and mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is either an applicant or an employee. 5
The ADA has been hailed by advocates for persons with disabilities as the
most important civil rights act passed since 1964,6 and as the "Emancipation
Proclamation" for Americans with disabilities.7 Critics of the ADA "cast the law
as overly broad, difficult to interpret, inefficient, and as a preferential treatment
initiative."' 8 Others question whether the law's economic benefits outweigh its
administrative costs." Empirical data also suggests that "the ADA's track record
in improving employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities appears
dismal."' Aggravating the problem, and contrary to the media's portrayal of the

1. 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999).
2. The official name of the Americans with Disabilities Act is the Equal
Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (1994)).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (1994).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
6. See 135 CONG. REc. S10708-01 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (stating that the ADA "has the potential to become one of the great civil rights
laws of our generation").
7. 136 CONG. REC. S9689 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin, chief
sponsor of the ADA) (describing the ADA as "the 20th century Emancipation
Proclamation for all persons with disabilities").
8. Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the
Americans With DisabilitiesAct: PartI-Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAuL L.

REv. 877, 877 (1997).
9. Id.
10. Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans
With DisabilitiesAct, PartIff."
Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?,21 BERKELEY J.
EmP. &LAB. L. 271,272 (2000). A recent report of the National Institute on Disability
and Rehabilitation Research indicates that the ADA has not led to an improvement of
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ADA as a windfall statute for plaintiffs, studies show that individuals with

disabilities are finding it nearly impossible to win in court. 2 Nonetheless, by
providing "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities," the ADA is an innovative
attempt by Congress to address the pervasive problem of discrimination against
persons with disabilities. 3
More than eight years after the effective date of Title I," fundamental
questions remain. This Note examines one aspect of the ongoing evaluation and
debate: What responsibilities do employers and employees have in the
reasonable accommodation process? The federal regulations implementing the
ADA provide guidance by suggesting that employers participate in an
"interactive process" to help their employees find reasonable accommodations.' 5
However, courts remain divided on the question whether employers must

employment conditions of individuals with disabilities generally. Id. at 271 (citing H.
Stephen Kaye, Is the Status of People with DisabilitiesImproving? I (Disability Stat.
Ctr., Disability Stat. Abstract No. 21, 1998)). Findings from the 1998 National
Organization on Disability/Harris Survey of Americans with Disabilities indicate that
twenty-nine percent of individuals with disabilities surveyed in 1998 were employed
compared to thirty-one percent in 1994 and thirty-four percent in 1986. For a summary
of the findings of the most recent survey, see National Organization on Disability/Harris
Survey of Americans with Disabilities, availableat http://www.nod.org/presssurvey.html
(visited Sept. 5, 2000).
11. See Ruth Colker, The Americans With Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 99 nn.2-3 (1999) (citing Ruth Shalit,
Defining DisabilityDown, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 25, 1997, at 16 (stating that ADA has
created a "lifelong buffet of perks, special breaks and procedural protections" for
individuals with questionable disabilities); Trevor Armbrister, A Good Law Gone Bad,
READER'S DIG., May 1998, at 145, 149 (asserting that plaintiffs "have used the ADA to
trigger an avalanche of frivolous suits clogging federal courts"); John Leo, Let's Lower
the Bar,U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 5, 1998, at 19 (arguing that the ADA has the
potential ""to force the rethinking and'watering down of every imaginable standard of
competence, whether of mind, body or character' (quoting WALTER OLSON, THE
EXCUSE FACTORY (1997)))).
12. See Colker, supranote 11, at 103-08 (finding that from 1992 through July 1998
defendants prevailed in employment discrimination cases under the ADA in 448 of 475
cases (94%) at the trial court level and in 376 of 448 cases (84%) in which plaintiffs
appealed adverse judgments); John W. Parry, ABA Survey of Employment Discrimination
Cases Brought Underthe Americans With DisabilitiesAct, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
121, at El (June 22, 2000) (reporting that of 434 Title I cases decided in 1999, 95.7%
resulted in employer wins, and noting that in some circuits, no employee wins occurred).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
14. The effective date of Title I of the ADA was July 26, 1992. Section 108
provided that: "This title [sub-chapter] shall become effective 24 months after the date
of enactment [July 26, 1990]." Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
§ 108, 104 Stat. 327 (1992).
15. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1999); see also discussion infra Part I1I.B.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/4
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participate in an interactive process and whether they can be held liable for
failure to do so. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
recently had the opportunity to consider this issue in Fjellestadv. Pizza Hut of
America, Inc.
1I. FACTS AND HOLDING
On December 14, 1994, Ellen Fjellestad was seriously injured in an
automobile accident that required her to be hospitalized for nearly one month. 6
Fjellestad's injuries included a lacerated liver, severe chest injuries, blunt trauma
to her right shoulder, and multiple broken ribs. 7 Prior to her accident, Fjellestad
had been a successful unit manager of8 the Yankton, South Dakota, Pizza Hut
restaurant for more than sixteen years.'
During Fjelestad's hospitalization and recovery, Linda Folkers, a senior
shift manager at the Pizza Hut restaurant, performed Fjellestad's unit manager
duties, which included: general administration of the restaurant, ensuring
customer satisfaction and restaurant cleanliness, maintaining restaurant safety
and financial control measures, managing bank deposits, and supervising,
training, and hiring employees.' 9 Pizza Hut expects unit managers to work fifty
hours a week, with the possibility of working fewer hours if they are able to
accomplish their duties in less time.2"
On April 28, 1995, Fjellestad's doctors released her to work two hours
every other day.2' However, in early May 1995, Fjellestad suffered another
accident and was again prohibited from working n Fjellestad returned to work
in June 1995 when her doctors released her to work four hours every other day
for a total of twelve hours per week z When
Fjellestad returned to work in June,
24
she and Folkers served as "co-managers.
On August 24, 1995, Fjellestad received the first of several memos she was
to eventually receive from Rick Swanson, her area Pizza Hut supervisor,
criticizing her for poor performance.Y By this time, Fjellestad's doctors had
released her to work twenty hours per week.26 As Ejellestad's work hours

16. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 1999).
17. Id.
18. Id. Fjellestad had received district and national recognition for her managerial
skills. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 948.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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continued to increase, Swanson continued to cite her for poor performance.27
Additionally, on October 23, 1995, Swanson met with Fjellestad and told her
that once she had exhausted her available leave time under the Family Medical
Leave Act, she would be welcomed back to the full-time unit manager position.28
Swanson also advised Fjellestad that if she was unable to work the required fifty
hours per week, she would be demoted to shift manager.29
In response to Swanson's conduct, Fjellestad filed a grievance letter with
Pizza Hut on November 15, 1995. In the letter she wrote, "'I request that I be
reasonably accommodated."' 3
In her grievance, Fjellestad also stated,
"'[d]emotion or termination would not be consistent with employer reasonable
accommodation duties."' ' 31 On December 12, 1995, Fjellestad received a call
from a representative of Pizza Hut's human resources department regarding her
grievance.32 Pizza Hut informed Fjellestad that she would be allowed to retain
her position as unit manager because she had been released by her doctor to
work a sufficient number of hours to perform her required duties.33 However,
Swanson placed her on a sixty-day performance plan that included bi-weekly
evaluations.34
On January 16, 1996, Fjellestad's doctors concluded that she had reached
her maximum recovery and determined that she had a thirty percent permanent
impairment to her upper right extremity and would have "prominent weakness
in her arms long term with probably some residual deficits for the rest of her
life."35 Additionally, Fjellestad's doctors limited her to working thirty-five to
forty hours per week with no more than three consecutive days of work.36
In a letter to Fjellestad dated January 4, 1996, Pizza Hut mentioned
assigning her to the shift manager position.37 Pizza Hut's internal
correspondence also mentioned this possibility.38 However, Pizza Hut never
offered the shift manager position to Fjellestad.39 Instead, on February 8, 1996,
*day forty-seven or forty-eight of the sixty-day performance plan, Fjellestad was
terminated by Swanson for allegedly failing to make adequate progress in
meeting the targets set forth in the performance plan.4' Linda Folkers was then
27. Id.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 948 n.1.
Id.
Id. at 948, 952.
Id. at 951.
Id. at 948.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 949.
Id. at 951.
Id.
Id. at 953.
Id. at 948.
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promoted to unit manager." Following her termination, Fjellestad filed two
additional grievances with Pizza Hut requesting reasonable accommodation.4 2
After Pizza Hut failed to take action, Fjellestad filed suit under Title I of the
ADA.43
In granting summary judgment for Pizza Hut, the United States District
Court for the District of South Dakota held that Fjellestad failed to establish a

claim because she was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA."
Furthermore, the district court held that even if Fjellestad were disabled, she was
not qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without
reasonable accommodation.45
Fjellestad appealed the district court's decision to the Eighth Circuit.4 The
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as
to whether Fjellestad was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.47
Specifically, the court determined that Fjellestad had created a factual dispute
about whether her overall employment opportunities were limited and whether
her medical restrictions significantly restricted the condition, manner, or duration
in which she could work as compared to an average person in the general
population."
The Eighth Circuit also held that employers who have received notice that
a reasonable accommodation is requested have a duty to engage in an interactive
process with the requesting employee, and summary judgment is precluded when
a genuine dispute exists as to whether the employer acted in good faith and
engaged in the interactive process. 49 The court also held that no independent
liability exists under the ADA if an employer fails to engage in the interactive
process.50 In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Fjellestad, the
court concluded that a genuine dispute existed about whether Pizza Hut made a
good faith effort to engage in the interactive process, and therefore, summary
judgment was inappropriate. 1

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 947-48.
Id. at 948.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 957.
Id. at 949-50.

49. Id. at 953. Nevertheless, the court held that the burden of persuasion remains
at all times on the employee. Id. at 957.

50. Id. at 952.
51. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
During the second half of the twentieth century, Congress took significant
steps to eliminate various forms of employment discrimination. 2 Most notably,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to provide for equal treatment of
individuals based on their membership in specific protected classes, including
race, color, sex, religion, and national origin." Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
prohibits employers from considering an individual's membership in one of the
five protected classes when deciding "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment," such as hiring, firing, and job classification.54
Under the plain meaning of Title VII, the class of individuals with
disabilities is not protected by the Civil Rights Act. In enacting the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 55-prohibiting disability-based discrimination by the
federal government, federal contractors, and recipients of federal funds in
matters of hiring, placement, or advancement 5 -- Congress sought 'to share with
handicapped Americans the opportunities for an education, transportation,
housing, health care, and jobs that other Americans take for granted."' 57 As
originally enacted, the Rehabilitation Act did not define what constituted
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. However, the regulations for
that portion of the Rehabilitation Act applying to employers provide guidance

52. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997); The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994); The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
53. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975, 2000e (1994).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Under Title VII:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment ...

or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his

employees or applicants for employment.., because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). It is also unlawful for employers to "fail or refuse to
refer for employment" or "to classify or refer for employment" an individual based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1994).
55. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797(b) (1994).
56. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1994). Section 504(a) of the Act provides that:
[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability... shall, solely by reason
of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance ....
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
57. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,277 (1987) (quoting
123 CONG. Rnc. 13515 (1977) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/4
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by requiring covered employers to provide "reasonable accommodations" to
qualified individuals with disabilities.5 8
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA and extended protection from
discrimination to individuals with disabilities in the private sector. 9 In 1992,
Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to apply the same standards from the
newly enacted ADA, including the reasonable accommodation requirement."

58. The regulations state:
(a) A [covered employer] shall make reasonable accommodation to the known
physical or mental limitation of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant
or employee ....
(d) A [covered employer] may not deny any employment opportunity to a
qualified handicapped employee or applicant if the basis for the denial is the
need to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental limitations
of the employee or applicant.
45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1996). An employee can establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act by demonstrating that: (1) he is an individual
who has a disability within the meaning of the statute; (2) he is otherwise qualified to
perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations
by the employer; and (3) he was nonetheless terminated or otherwise prevented from
performing the job. See Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 418 (3d Cir. 1997). An
employer can defeat an employee's claim by showing that: (1) making a reasonable
accommodation would cause it hardship, and (2) the hardship would be undue. See
Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1997).
59. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The ADA is divided into five titles,
each prohibiting discrimination against Americans with disabilities, but in different
contexts. Title I prohibits discrimination by private employers. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1211112117 (1994). Title II prohibits discrimination in the provision of programs, services,
and activities by state and local governments. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12150 (1994).
Title III prohibits discrimination by public accommodations, such as hotels, restaurants,
retail stores, museums, parks, and health clubs, in the provision of goods and services.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994). Title IV provides for telecommunications for
individuals with hearing and speech disabilities and for close-captioning of public service
announcements. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-229 (1994). Title V contains several
miscellaneous provisions. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (1994).
60. While more comprehensive in its application, the ADA was modeled after the
Rehabilitation Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder. See H.R. REP. No. 101485, pt. 2, at 54-55 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303 (stating that the range

of employment decisions covered by Title I of the ADA is intended to be consistent with
regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 62
(directing that interpretation of the concept of a "reasonable accommodation" is to be
generally consistent with interpretations of that term under the Rehabilitation Act); H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 67 (noting that the concept of "undue hardship" is derived
from and should be interpreted consistently with regulations implementing the
Rehabilitation Act). See also 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1994) (stating that Rehabilitation Act
is to be interpreted in accordance with the standards applied under the ADA); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117(b) (1994) (stating that federal agencies administering federal disability statutes
are to avoid subjecting employment discrimination claims to "inconsistent or conflicting
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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A. The ADA
Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, which covers only the federal government,
federal contractors, and recipients of federal funds, the ADA was the first
attempt by Congress to provide comprehensive protection to the class of

individuals with disabilities from discrimination based on their disabilities, real
or perceived."' The ADA reaches private, and state and local government
employers, and it provides protection from discrimination in the areas of state
and local government services, public accommodations, and the provision of
telecommunications services.62 Title I of the ADA, the focus of this Note, covers
employment

discrimination

and prohibits

covered

employers 3

from

discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities." An employer
commits unlawful discrimination under the ADA if the employer does "not
mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee. ' 5
Unlike other statutes prohibiting discrimination in employment, the
reasonable accommodation requirement of the ADA forces employers to
recognize that workplaces were traditionally designed for "the average, normal,
able-bodied majority." 66 Particularly, by defining discrimination as the failure
to make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations

standards"); Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1994)); City of Mount
Vernon, 118 F.3d at 96 (stating that terms common to both the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA are to be interpreted in the same manner); Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d
1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are
instructive and looked to for guidance in interpreting the ADA).
61. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). When the ADA was enacted in 1990,
approximately 43 million Americans had one or more physical or mental disabilities. See
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).
62. See supra note 59.
63. Since July 5, 1994, employer means "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person
....
" 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). The ADA provides that: "No covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability
of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
66. FRANK G. BowE, HANDICAPPING AMERICA, at viii (1978) ("For two hundred
years, we have designed a nation for the average, normal, able-bodied majority, little

realizing that millions cannot enter many of our buildings, ride our subways and buses,
enjoy our educational and recreational programs and facilities, and use our
communications systems.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/4
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of an individual with a disability, the ADA requires employers to make
adjustments in the workplace that afford individuals with disabilities the
opportunity to perform the essential functions of theirjobs. Thus, the reasonable
accommodation requirement is not a means of giving individuals with
disabilities a competitive advantage, but rather a means of leveling the playing
field.67
To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that
(1) she is disabled within the meaning of the Act,68 (2) she is qualified69 to

67. See Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 526 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting
that the reasonable accommodation process does not require an employer to create a new
position for an employee with a disability); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695,
700 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1172 (1996) (stating that the statute does not
require "affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities, in the sense of
requiring that disabled persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment over those who
are not disabled"); Emrick v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 398 (E.D. Tex.
1995) (holding that "the ADA does not require that an employer substantially modify its
operations in order to ensure every disabled individual the benefits of employment....
To hold otherwise would entitle employees with disabilities to more opportunities for
employment than are offered to employees without disabilities, and such is not the intent
of the ADA."); 136 CONG. REC. 10856 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Hoyer) ("[The ADA] does not guarantee a job-or anything else. It guarantees a level
playing field."); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.1(a), at 350 (2000) (ADA "requires that
individuals with disabilities be given the same consideration for employment that
individuals without disabilities are given"). However, critics of the ADA have
characterized an employer's obligation to provide accommodations as a form of market
distortion leading to economic inefficiencies. See John J. Donohue Ill, Employment
DiscriminationLaw in Perspective: Three Concepts ofEquality, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2583,
2608-09 (1994). Critics claim that the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation to
individuals with disabilities creates an employment privilege or subsidy, in that it
attempts to provide covered workers the wages they would receive in a
nondiscriminatory free market. Id. at 2609. See also Pamela S. Karlan & George
Rutherglen, Disabilities,Discrimination,and ReasonableAccommodation, 46 DUKE L.J.
1, 14 (1996) ("Reasonable accommodation is affirmative action, in the sense that it
requires an employer to take account of an individual's disabilities and to provide special
treatment to him for that reason.").
68. A "disability" is defined as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). Hence, to fall within this definition an individual must have
an actual disability (subsection (A)), have a record of a disability (subsection (B)), or be
regarded as having a disability (subsection (C)). See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 478 (1999). The Supreme Court in Sutton explained the definition of
"disability" by reference to the EEOC regulations:
After restating the definition of disability given in the statute .... the EEOC
regulations define the three elements of disability: (1) "physical or mental
impairment," (2) "substantially limits," and (3) "major life activities." See
[29 CFR] §§ 1630.2(h)-(j). Under the regulations a "physical impairment"
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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perform the essential functions of the job either with or without reasonable
accommodation," and (3) she has suffered adverse employment action because

of the disability.7 While the ADA does not clearly state what a plaintiff must
prove to prevail on a claim of discrimination under Title I, courts that have
considered such claims have typically applied Tile VII's burden-shifting

framework first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green72 and
elaborated in subsequent cases.73 Given the obvious difficulty of gathering direct

includes "[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic
and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine." § 1630.2(h)(1). The term "substantially
limits" means, among other things, "[u]nable to perform a major life activity
that the average person in the general population can perform;" or
"[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which
an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity." § 1630.20). Finally,
"[m]ajor [l]ife [a]ctivities means functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working." § 1630.2(i).
Id. at 479-80.
69. The determination of whether an individual is "qualified" in the Eighth Circuit
involves a two-fold inquiry: "(1) whether the individual meets the necessary
prerequisites for the job, such as education, experience, training, and the like; and (2)
whether the individual can perform the essential job functions, with or without
reasonable accommodation." Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City, 214
F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108,
1111-12 (8th Cir. 1995)).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)-(B) (1994). The ADA does not define
"reasonable accommodation" but merely gives examples of what one might be. The term
"reasonable accommodation" may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
useable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time
or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994). While the definition of reasonable accommodation might
elude precise definition, the Eighth Circuit has noted that an employer need not provide
an accommodation that completely removes from the disabled employee's job the
essential functions that a person in that job must perform. See Benson, 62 F.3d at 111213.
71. See Benson, 62 F.3d at 1112.
72. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
73. The burden-shifting method of proof in Title VII cases was developed in a
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/4
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evidence of discrimination, the Title VII burden-shifting framework allows
plaintiffs to prove discrimination even absent direct evidence of discrimination.7'
Under the burden-shifting framework, the plaintiff's prima facie case of
discrimination serves to create a rebuttable presumption that, in the absence of
direct evidence of discrimination, the employer's decision was based on an
impermissible factor.7"
If the plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden of production then shifts to the employer, who must come forward with
a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its action.76 If the employer is able

trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases. See McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 792;
Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). See, e.g., Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173,
1184 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework will
be appropriate in disability discrimination cases where the "plaintiff has no direct
evidence of discrimination and the employer disclaims reliance on the plaintiffs
disability"); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995) (approving
the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method of proof in ADA claim for
disparate treatment).
74. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also infra note 75.
75. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. To prove a prima facie case of
employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff must
show: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the protected class; (2) the plaintiff applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite the
plaintiff's qualifications, the employer rejected the plaintiff; and (4) after the plaintiffs
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons possessing the plaintiff's qualifications. Id.; see also Monette, 90 F.3d at 1179
(discussing McDonnell Douglas/Burdineformula under Title VII cases).
76. McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802; see also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07 ("the
McDonnell Douglas presumption places upon the [employer] the burden of producing
an explanation to rebut the prima facie case"); Burdine,450 U.S. at 255-56 ("Placing this
burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiffs
prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual
issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff-will have a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate pretext."). Under Title I of the ADA, a legitimate reason an employer may
offer for its action is that the employee's proposed reasonable accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer's business. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994) (employer commits unlawful discrimination if the employer

does not provide reasonable accommodation, "unless [the employer] can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of
[the employer]"). The ADA defines undue hardship as an action that causes an employer
great difficulty or expense when considered with regard to the employer's overall
business needs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994). Factors to be considered in
determining whether an action imposes an undue hardship include:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed... ; (ii) the overall
financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the
reasonable accommodation; the number ofpersons employed at such facility;
the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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to offer a legitimate reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
the proffered reason was only a pretext for the employer's decision." The trier
of fact must then decide the ultimate question of the case: "whether [the
employee] has proven 'that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [the
employee]."' 78 Thus, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact of
employment discrimination under Title VII (and arguably under Title I of the
ADA) remains at all times on the employee. 9 The Eighth Circuit's decision in

Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc."0 is illustrative of how the court has
incorporated Title VII's burden-shifting framework into of a reasonable
accommodation employment discrimination case under the ADA.
In Benson, the plaintiff worked as a mechanic for Northwest and, after
suffering severe chest pains on the job, was diagnosed with a rare neurological
disorder that causes pain and weakness or numbness in the individual's arm and
shoulder.8' Initially, Northwest transferred Benson to a position where
employees with work-related injuries were allowed to work until they were able
to return to their former positions or find alternative positions. 2 One month
later, Benson's doctor advised Northwest of Benson's medical condition and
recommended that he no longer work in any job requiring extensive use of his
left arm or repetitive motion of his left shoulder and that his previous job as a
mechanic would be totally inappropriate given his condition.83 After being

accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial
resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered
entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and
location of its facilities; and (iv) the type of operation or operations of the
covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the
workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or
fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (1994).
77. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
78. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (quoting Burdine,450 U.S. at 253).
79. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); see
also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 511 (1993). However, some
scholars criticize the courts' reflexive and often blind reliance on Title VII precedent by
noting many fundamental differences that exist between employment discrimination
under Title VII and employment discrimination on the basis of disability as defined in
Title I of the ADA. See, e.g., Kevin W. Williams, Note, The ReasonableAccommodation
Difference: The Effect ofApplying the Burden ShiflingFrameworks Developed Under
Title VII in DisparateTreatment Cases to Claims Brought Under Title I ofthe Americans
with DisabilitiesAct, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 98 (1997).
80. 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 1995).
81. Id. at 1110.

82. Id.
83. Id.
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bumped by a senior employer from one job, disqualified from another
job, and
4
placed on ninety-days unpaid leave, Northwest terminated Benson.'
Benson filed an ADA claim alleging that Northwest discriminated against
him because of his disability and failed to reasonably accommodate his
disability."5 Northwest did not dispute that Benson was disabled or that his
disability precipitated his termination.86 Hence, the issue before the Eighth
Circuit was whether the employee made a facial showing that a reasonable
accommodation was possible. 7 In answering this question, the Benson court
also established the appropriate burden-shifting framework to be used in
discrimination cases brought under Title I of the ADA in the Eighth Circuit.
The Benson court held that once the employee "makes 'a facial showing
that reasonable accommodation is possible,' the burden of production shifts to
the employer to show that it is unable to accommodate the employee." 8
Furthermore, the court explained that "[i]f the employer shows that the employee
camot perform the essential functions of the job even with reasonable
accommodation, the employee must rebut the showing with evidence of his
individual capabilities." 9 The court explained that at this point, the "employee's
burden merges with his ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that he has
suffered unlawful discrimination." 90 However, the Benson court also held that
when the employer disputes the evidence that an employee can perform the
essential functions of the job in question, the employer must come forward with
some evidence of what those "essential functions" are. 91
Applying this framework, the Benson court determined that summary
judgment was inappropriate because "[m]aterial issues of fact remain[ed] as to
what the essential functions of the positions [were], whether Benson [could]
perform them, and, if not, whether a reasonable accommodation by Northwest
would enable him to do so."'g' The court concluded that Benson had made a

84. Id. at 1110-11.
85. Id. at 1111.
86. Id. at 1112.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Mason v. Frank, 32 F.3d 315, 318-19 (8th Cir. 1989)).
89. Id. Butsee Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 n.12 (6th Cir.
1996) (The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's holding in Benson that the
employer bears the burden of showing that the employee cannot perform the essential
functions of the job even with the proposed reasonable accommodation. Rather, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the employer bears the burden of establishing that a
proposed reasonable accommodation imposes an undue hardship, but no reason exists
for also requiring the employer to show that the employee is unqualified for the position
even with the proposed accommodation.).
90. Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing
Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
91. Id. at 1113.
92. Id. at 1112.
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facial showing that reasonable accommodation was possible.93 At this point,
because Northwest disputed Benson's evidence that he could perform the
essential functions of the mechanic's job, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
burden shifted to Northwest to "put on some evidence of those essential
functions. 94
The court once again reiterated that Benson retained the ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that he could perform the essential functions of the
job, with or without accommodation. 9 However, the court pointed out that
"much of the information which determines those essential functions lies
uniquely with the employer."' Consequently, because the court determined that
Benson made a facial showing that reasonable accommodation was possible, the
failure of Northwest to present "some evidence" that accommodation was
impossible precluded summaryjudgment.' While the bilateral obligations of the
employer and an employee with a disability in reaching an accommodation were
not at issue in Benson, the Eighth Circuit's recognition that the employer may
possess information unavailable to the employee begs the question of what those
obligations might be.
The ADA's statutory language does not specifically articulate the parties'
obligation in the accommodation process or provide a method for assigning
responsibility when the process fails. However, Congress did delegate
rulemaking authority under the ADA to several different federal agencies,
depending on the particular subject matter involved. 98 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is authorized to issue regulations governing
private employment discrimination. 9
B. EEOC Regulationsand the InteractiveProcess
With regard to reasonable accommodations, the EEOC regulations provide
some guidance concerning employer participation in the process of finding a
reasonable accommodation, suggesting that "it may be necessary for [an

93. Id.
94. Id. at 1113.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1115.
98. With the exception of transportation services, the Department of Justice is
designated as the agency with authority to issue regulations with respect to the provision
of programs and services, by state and local governments, see 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a)
(1994), and by public accommodations and commercial facilities, see 42 U.S.C. §
12186(b) (1994). The Department of Transportation has rulemaking authority with
respect to provisions governing transportation services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12149(a),
12186(a) (1994).
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., at 350 (2000)
).
("The [EEOC] is responsible for enforcement of title I of the [ADA] ....
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employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified
individual with a disability" to determine whether a reasonable accommodation
exists or to select a specific reasonable accommodation. 0 0 The Interpretive
Guidance Appendix ("Appendix") to the ADA regulations makes it clear that the
ADA envisions a "flexible, interactive process that involves both the employer
and the [employee] with a disability."''
According to the Appendix, once an employee has requested an
accommodation, an employer has a duty to make reasonable efforts to determine
an appropriate accommodation.' 2 Because of inherent information asymmetries
between employers and employees, the Appendix stresses the importance of
communication between the parties in order to determine a reasonable
accommodation:
[I]n some instances neither the individual requesting the
accommodation nor the employer can readily identify the appropriate
For example, the individual needing the
accommodation.

accommodation may not know enough about the equipment used by
the employer or the exact nature of the work site to suggest an
appropriate accommodation. Likewise, the employer may not know
enough about the individual's disability or the limitations that
disability would impose on the performance of the job to suggest an
appropriate accommodation. 3
The Appendix offers a four step interactive process that employers should
follow when an employee with a disability requests a reasonable
accommodation. The four step process that employers should follow includes:
(1) analyzing the particular job and determining its purpose and essential
100. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1999). The regulations, in full, provide:
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be
necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with
the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This

process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability
and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those
limitations.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1999).
101. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9, at 364 (2000) (Process of Determining the
Appropriate Reasonable Accommodation).
102. Section 1630.9 of the ADA Interpretive Guidance reads in pertinent part:
Once a qualified individual with a disability has requested provision of
a reasonable accommodation, the employer must make a reasonable effort to
determine the appropriate accommodation. The appropriate reasonable
accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive process that
involves both the employer and the qualified individual with a disability.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9, at 364 (2000).
103. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9, at 365 (2000).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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functions, (2) consulting with the individual with a disability to ascertain the
precise job-related limitations and how those limitations could be overcome with
a reasonable accommodation, (3) consulting with the individual with a disability
to identify and assess the effectiveness of potential accommodations, and (4)
considering the preferences of the individual to be accommodated and selecting
and implementing the accommodation most appropriate for both the employee
and the employer.'"
Because this interactive process is strongly recommended by the EEOC, °5
the question arises whether an employer's failure to participate in the interactive
process creates automatic liability independent from a failure to accommodate
an employee's disability. Consequently, a split among the federal circuit courts
of appeals has resulted concerning whether employers have a duty to engage in
the interactive process and if independent liability exists if an employer fails to
engage in the interactive process. While all courts agree that employers should
engage in an interactive process with their employees, the Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits have held that they would not permit a cause of action against
an employer who fails to engage in an interactive process. 6 The Third, Fifth,

104. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9, at 364 (2000) (Process of Determining
the Appropriate Reasonable Accommodation). Courts have also interpreted the plain
language of the ADA regulations to require an interactive process that requires
participation by both employees and employers. See, e.g., Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Kan. City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1022 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that "the employee
does not have the burden of identifying open positions without the employer's
assistance" (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 316 (3d Cir. 1999))
and noting that employer has a "corresponding obligation to help [an employee] identify
appropriate job vacancies (since [employees] can hardly be expected to hire detectives
to look for vacancies)" (quoting Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 n.27,
(D.C. Cir. 1998))); Mole v. Buckhom Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir.
1999) ("[Employee] cannot 'expect the employer to read [her] mind and know [she]
secretly wanted a particular accommodation and [then] sue the employer for not
providing it."' (quoting Ferry v. Roosevelt Bank, 883 F. Supp. 435, 441 (E.D. Mo.
1995))); Scheer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 956 F. Supp. 1496, 1501 (N.D. Iowa 1997)
("Because [the employee] has first-hand knowledge of both his disability and his job, an
employee has substantial responsibility for identifying the nature of a reasonable
accommodation.").
105. See Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (stating that
"while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, [the EEOC
Guidelines] do constitute a body of evidence and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance").
106. See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 196 F.3d 979, 992-93 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the ADA does not impose independent and automatic liability on an
employer for failing to engage in an interactive process with an employee with a
disability to investigate whether a reasonable accommodation exists); Willis v. Conopco,
Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the employee has the burden of
showing available accommodations and that the employer cannot be found liable "merely
for failing to engage in the [interactive] process itself'); White v. York Int'l Corp., 45
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/4

16

Kingsbury: Kingsbury: Must We Talk about That Reasonable Accommodation
THE ADA AND THE INTERACTIVE PROCESS

20001

and Seventh Circuits have taken the position that once an employee requests a
reasonable accommodation, the employer has a duty to engage in an interactive
process.' 7' However, of those circuits requiring employer participation in the
interactive process, only the Seventh Circuit appears willing to assign
independent liability for failure to engage in the interactive process.'0 8 Rather
than impose independent liability, those circuits recognizing a duty to engage in

the interactive process have held that the employee still has the burden of
proving that a reasonable accommodation could have been made, and evidence
that a employer acted in bad faith in the interactive process only precludes
summary judgment for the employer." 9

C. Circuits Not RequiringEmployer Participation

in the InteractiveProcess
The Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have not deferred to the EEOC's
regulations suggesting employer participation in the interactive process. The

Ninth Circuit's decision in Barnett v. U.S. Air,Inc." is illustrative. In Barnett,
a ten-year employee of U.S. Air injured his back while handling cargo at

work."' When Bamett could no longer perform the physical requirements of his

F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that the regulations only recommend that an
interactive process occur, and only after the employee shows that reasonable
accommodation is possible). The First Circuit also appears to take the position that the

EEOC regulations are permissive rather than mandatory. See Jacques v. Clean-Up
Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506, 513 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The regulations' use of 'may' clearly
suggests that Congress, while it could have imposed an affirmative obligation upon
employers in all cases, chose not to."). However, the First Circuit in Jacques also stated,
"[t]here may well be situations in which the employer's failure to engage in an informal
interactive process would constitute a failure to provide reasonable accommodation that
amounts to a violation of the ADA." Jacques,96 F.3d at 515.
107. See, e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 312-13 (3d Cir.
1999) (holding that an employer's knowledge of an employee's disability triggers an
obligation to participate in an interactive process to provide a reasonable
accommodation); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996)
(finding that an employee's request for accommodation obligates the employer to
participate in the interactive process of determining a reasonable accommodation); Beck
v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135-37 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
both parties have a responsibility to participate in an interactive process). The Eighth
Circuit addressed this issue in Fjellestadv. Pizza Hut ofAmerica, Inc., 188 F.3d 944 (8th

Cir. 1999).
108. See, e.g., Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 373 (7th Cir. 2000)
(upholding jury verdict for employee because "[employer] flunked its obligations under
the ADA [to engage in an interactive process]").
109. See discussion infra Part III.D.
110. 196 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1999).
111. Id. at 985. Barnett's restrictions included prohibitions from excessive
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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job because of his back injury, he used his seniority to obtain a position in the
mailroom. However, two years later, U.S. Air decided to open all of its
mailroom positions to bidding, with positions to be awarded based on seniority.
Fearing that he would lose his mailroom position, Barnett asked for an ADA
accommodation, seeking an exception to the company's seniority system that
would allow him to remain in the mailroom. U.S. Air declined to supersede its
seniority system, but for the next five months placed Barnett on "limited duty,"
allowing him to work in a temporary swing-shift mailroom position.
Subsequently, Barnett was placed on job injury leave, which continued his salary
for one month. Barnett then requested two other forms of accommodation that
U.S. Air denied." 2
Barnett filed suit against U.S. Air for discrimination under the ADA." 3
While the district court acknowledged that Barnett had proven that he was
disabled within the meaning of the ADA, the court concluded that "Barnett's
proposed accommodations of his disability were not reasonable" and granted
U.S. Air's motion for summary judgment."4 The district court also held that an
employer can be independently liable for failing to engage in an interactive
process."' The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment but disagreed with the
district court's reasoning and held that "[t]he ADA and its regulations do not.
..create independent liability for the employer for failing to engage in ritualized
discussions with the employee to find a reasonable accommodation."". 6
The Barnettcourt interpreted the language used in the EEOC regulations
as permissive, but nonetheless issued a warning to employers that a failure to
engage in the interactive process may expose them to liability for failing to make
reasonable accommodations." 7 The court noted that holding employers
automatically liable for failing to participate in the interactive process could
create liability for an employer that had reasonably accommodated its

bending, twisting, turning, prolonged standing or sitting, and from lifting twenty-five
pounds or more. Id. at 986.
112. Id.
113. Id. Barnett also sued U.S. Air under the ADA for retaliation. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 986-87. However, the district court found that U.S. Air was not liable
because it had responded to Bamett's requests and was not at fault for the parties' failure
to identify a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 987.
116. Id. at 993. The Ninth Circuit held that the employee in an ADA
discrimination case "must be able to point to at least one specific reasonable
accommodation that was available to the employer (but which the employer presumably
did not pursue)." Id. at 989. Once the employee makes out a prima facie case, the
burden then shifts to the employer to show that the accommodation would constitute an
undue hardship. Id.

117. Id. at 993-94.
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employee's disability, but had nevertheless failed to engage in the interactive
process. This, in the court's opinion, was an irrational result." 8
The Ninth Circuit also expressed concern about how a rule imposing
independent employer liability would work, noting that the point at which an
employer incurs process liability is unclear. 9 The court did, however, recognize
that an employer should engage in an interactive process with its employees with
disabilities because such a process will ensure an "optimal" accommodation to
the employee's limitation. 20 Nevertheless, the court held that the appropriate
inquiry is whether the employer failed to make required reasonable
accommodations for the employee.' 2 ' While failure to engage in an interactive
process may be relevant to that inquiry, in the Ninth Circuit's opinion, it is not
a separate inquiry."
Similar to the Barnettmajority, in Willis v. Conopco,Inc., 23 the Eleventh
Circuit held that employers cannot be held independently liable for failing to
engage in the interactive process. 24 The court held that "where a plaintiff cannot
demonstrate 'reasonable accommodation,' the employer's lack of investigation
into reasonable accommodation is unimportant."' 2 The court expressed fear of
potential employer liability for failing to engage in .the interactive process in

118. Id. at 994.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The dissent disagreed with the majority's view of the EEOC language as
permissive concerning the interactive process. Id. at 996. According to the dissent, if
the employer has no obligation to participate in determining if a reasonable
accommodation exists, "the effectiveness of the ADA as a tool to use constructively the
skills of disabled persons is seriously diminished." Id. at 995. Furthermore, the dissent
argued that the burden imposed by requiring the interactive process would not be overly
burdensome and may be as minor as communicating with the employee about the
problem. Id. at 997.
123. 108 F.3d 282 (llth Cir. 1997).
124. Id. at 285. Willis was an employee at Lever Brothers (Conopco) who had a
sensitivity to enzymes in the laundry detergent she packaged. Conopco attempted to
accommodate Willis by minimizing her exposure to the enzymes, which included
transferring her to a new position and directing her to wear a mask when crossing the
packing area floor. Following unrelated foot surgery, Willis provided Conopco with a
doctor's letter stating that she had an immune system abnormality and should stop
working at the plant. At this point, Willis refused to return to work and requested that
Conopco either reassign her to a new building or enclose the area in which she worked.
Id. at 283. Conopco then arranged for Willis to be examined by a pulmonologist who
determined that she was capable to return to work. When Willis failed to return to work,
Conopco terminated her employment. Id. at 284. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of Conopco. Id. at 287.
125. Id. at 285 (quoting Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 448 (1lth
Cir. 1996)).
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instances where an investigation into reasonable accommodations "would [be]
fruitless."' 26 The court also stated that the punitive approach of automatic
employer liability for failure to participate in an interactive process is
inconsistent with the basic remedial goals of the ADA, which work to ensure
that individuals with disabilities "can fully participate in all aspects of society,
including the workplace."' 2 7
Likewise, in White v. York InternationalCorp., the Tenth Circuit rejected
the EEOC's recommendations that employers are required to engage in an
interactive process. 9 The court stated that EEOC recommendations are not
statutory requirements, and they only suggest employer participation once an
employee
has proven himself to be "qualified" within the meaning of the
30
ADA.'
D. CircuitsRequiringEmployer Participation
in the InteractiveProcess
Courts requiring employer participation in the interactive process defer to

the EEOC's regulations. These courts differ regarding whether the employer or
employee bears the initial burden of commencing the interactive process, but all
agree that courts should require employers and employees to participate in the
process. The Seventh Circuit was one of the first circuit courts to take this
position.
In Beck v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 3 ' Lorraine Beck, a
secretarial employee, suffered from osteoarthritis and depression." After a
126. Id. (quoting Moses, 97 F.3d at 448).
127. Id.
128. 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995).
129. Id. at 361-63. White's position required lifting and continuous standing, for
York, a manufacturer of commercial air conditioners. Id. at 358-59. White injured his
ankle in a non-work related accident and after undergoing surgery presented York with
a doctor's note restricting his physical activities. After a York appointed doctor
determined that White was unable to return to work, York terminated White. York
argued that it terminated White because of his excessive absenteeism and because they
were unaware of possible reasonable accommodations for White's disability. Id. at 359.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment in favor
of York. Id. at 363. The court noted that White did not meet his required burden of
proof by making "bald conclusions" that he could have performed his job with
reasonable accommodations. Id. at 362. Instead, White needed to demonstrate "a
genuine issue of fact regarding his ability to perform the essential functions [of his
position] with reasonable accommodation." Id. The Tenth Circuit held that as with
discrimination cases generally, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion at all times.
Id. at 361.
130. Id. at 363.
131. 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996).
132. Id. at 1132.
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three month medical leave, Beck was assigned to a new position where she was
given a month to learn and practice a word processing program. Thereafter,
Beck suffered from osteoarthritis aggravated by repetitive keyboarding. Beck's
doctors recommended that she avoid repetitive keyboarding. A few months
later, Beck was hospitalized with severe depression and anxiety. When she
returned to work, Beck had a note from her doctor indicating that she may
require some
reasonable accommodation so that she would not have a
133
recurrence.
The University then requested that Beck sign a release allowing them 1to
34
obtain further medical information from her doctor, which she refused to do.
Beck then took a second medical leave, and on her return to work had another
letter from her doctor indicating that she may require assistance with her work
load and an adjustable keyboard. The Assistant Dean then forwarded a memo
to Beck indicating that the University needed more information in order to
understand what accommodations she needed. Beck was also temporarily
moved to a new room, given a wrist pad, and given a reduced work load. Beck
was not satisfied with the new assignment and complained that the new room
was not properly ventilated. Beck then took a third medical leave and was
granted a six-month unpaid medical leave of absence. During her medical leave
of absence, Beck filed a charge with the EEOC and subsequently filed suit in the
district court under the ADA. After filing suit, Beck requested that she be
reinstated at the University in a different department. The University denied her
request and told her to report to work in the same department. When she did not
report to work, she was terminated by the University.'35
The Beck court observed that "the crux of this dispute is one not clearly
answered by the ADA: does the employer or the employee bear ultimate
36
responsibility for determining exactly what accommodations are needed?"'
The court noted that before a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation
triggers ADA liability, the employee bears the initial burden of informing the
employer of the disability. 37 The court explained that this approach is merely
a "common sense" extension of the ADA, which requires reasonable
accommodations for "known physical or mental limitations" of an employee.'
Furthermore, the Beck court stated that while "[i]t is plain enough what
'accommodation' means, 139 the employer has some responsibility in

133. Id. at 1132-33.
134. Id. at 1133.
135. Id. at 1134.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1134; see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
139. Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir.
1995)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 4
MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 65

determining the necessary accommodation."4 The court acknowledged that the
EEOC regulations envisioned an interactive process that requires participation
by both parties. 4' The Seventh Circuit concluded:

[C]ourts should look for signs of failure to participate in good faith or
failure by one of the parties to make reasonable efforts to help the
other party determine what specific accommodations are necessary.
A party that obstructs or delays the interactive process is not acting in
good faith. A party that fails to communicate, by way of initiation or
response, may also be acting in bad faith. In essence, courts should
attempt to isolate the cause of the breakdown and then assign
responsibility. 4 2
Finally, the court held that once an employer knows of an employee's disability,
and the employee has requested reasonable accommodations, the parties are
required to engage in an interactive process to determine what accommodations
are necessary, and liability for failure to provide reasonable accommodations
ensues only when the employer is responsible for a breakdown in the process.'43

In upholding summary judgment infavor of the University, the Beck court
concluded that the University had properly engaged in the interactive process
and Beck had caused the breakdown by failing to provide requested medical
information and refusing to sign a medical release.'" However, in Gile v. United
Airlines, Inc., 45 the Seventh Circuit upheld a jury award for the employee
because the employer "flunked its obligations under the ADA" to engage with

the employee in the interactive process to determine alternative accommodations
that might have permitted the employee to continue working.' 6
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1137. InBultemeyerv. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285-86
(7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that an employer's duty to participate
in the interactive process in cases involving employees with mental disabilities may be
heightened. The court held that an employer must both initiate and participate in the
interactive process if the employer has reason to assume the employee with a mental
disability may need an accommodation. Id. at 1286. See generally John F. Birmingham,
Jr., The InteractiveAccommodation Process-Cooperateor Pay the Price,77 MICH. B.J.
1044, 1046 (1998); Sam Silverman, The ADA InteractiveProcess: The Employer and
EmplQyee'sDuty to Work Together to Identify a ReasonableAccommodation Is More
than a Game ofFive CardStud, 77 NEB. L. REV. 281,294 (1998).
144. See Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1132, 1136-37 (7th
Cir. 1996).
145. 213 F.3d 365 (7th Cir. 2000).
146. Id. at 373; see also Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 700
(7th Cir. 1998) ("[The record does not permit the conclusion that the ADA requirement
of a flexible, interactive process... has been fulfilled as a matter of law."). It appears
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In Taylor v. PrincipalFinancialGroup,Inc., 47 Mark Taylor, the manager
of Principal Mutuals' El Paso, Texas office, suffered from bipolar and anxiety
disorders and accused his employer of discrimination under the ADA for failure
to provide reasonable accommodations!"8 Analogous to the Seventh Circuit in
Beck, the Fifth Circuit stated that, had a request for accommodation been made,
"the responsibility for fashioning a reasonable accommodation is shared between
the employee and employer.' ' 49 However, the court held that if the employee
fails to request an accommodation, the employer cannot be held liable for failing
to provide one.'
The court in Principal Financial also noted the importance of
distinguishing between an employer's knowledge of a disability and an
employer's knowledge of limitations caused by the disability. The court held
that an employer only has a duty to reasonably accommodate an employee when

the employer knows of limitations resulting from the employee's disability
because the ADA "requires employers to reasonably accommodate limitations,
not disabilities.''
The court explained that the ADA does not require an
employer to assume that an employee with a disability suffers from a limitation,

but rather public policy should dictate the opposite presumption; namely,
employees
with disabilities are not limited in their abilities to perform their
52

jobs.

In Taylor v. Phoenixville School District,53 the Third Circuit also held that
employers have a duty to engage in an interactive process with an employee in
order to determine an appropriate reasonable accommodation. 5 4 The Taylor

that the Seventh Circuit is the only court that has held that failure to interact in the
process is sufficient for independent employer liability under Title I of the ADA.
147. 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996).
148. Id. at 160-61.
149. Id. at 165.
150. Id. The Fifth Circuit's decision in PrincipalFinancialis not as broad as the
Seventh Circuit's rulings. The Fifth Circuit requires employer participation in the
interactive process only after the employee has initially requested an accommodation.
Id.
151. Id. at 164.
152. Id. The court affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment for
the employer because the court held that Taylor had failed to make known his limitations
and had failed to request accommodations, thus the need for reasonable accommodation
and the interactive process did not arise. Id. at 165-66. The Fifth Circuit has held that
demonstration of a breakdown in the interactive process alone is not sufficient to
establish an ADA claim. See Allen v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 622 (5th
Cir. 2000) (upholding summary judgment for employer even though employee
demonstrated a breakdown in the interactive process).
153. 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999).
154. Id. at 319. Prior to her termination, Katherine Taylor worked for twenty years
as a principal's secretary in the Phoenixville School District. In late August 1993, Taylor
began to suffer from the onset of bipolar disorder. During Taylor's leave of absence,
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court stated that "the interactive process, as its name implies, requires the
employer to take some initiative."'' s Elaborating on the interactive process, the
court explained:
The interactive process would have little meaning if it [were]
interpreted to allow employers, in the face of a request for
accommodation, simply to sit back passively, offer nothing, and then,
in post-termination litigation, try to knock down every specific
accommodation as too burdensome. That's not the proactive process
intended: it does not help avoid litigation by bringing the parties to a
negotiated settlement, and it unfairly exploits the employee's
comparative lack of information about what accommodations the
employer might allow."5 6
While extolling the virtues of the interactive process, the Taylor court
nevertheless concluded that the "interactive process does not dictate that any
particular concession be made by the employer; nor does the process remove the
employee's burden of showing that a particular accommodation rejected by the
employer would have made the employee qualified to perform the job's essential
functions."' 7 In short, the court found that all the interactive process required
was that employers make a good-faith effort to seek accommodations.'
The Third Circuit then explained that because employers have a duty to

help employees with disabilities devise accommodations, an employer who acts
in bad faith in the interactive process will be liable if the jury could reasonably
conclude that the employee would have been able to perform the job with
accommodations.' 9 Consequently, the court held that the jury is entitled to bear
in mind that, had the employer participated in good faith, there may have been
other, unmentioned possible accommodations, and when an employee has
evidence that the employer did not act in good faith in the interactive process,
summary judgment is inappropriate. 160

Taylor's son stated that he had numerous phone conversations with the school district's
administrative assistant for personnel, including one conversation in which he stated that
his mother would require accommodations when she returned to work. Id. at 301. Upon
Taylor's return to work in October 1993, her principal immediately began to document
her errors. Id. at 304. In September 1994, Taylor was placed on thirty days probation
and eventually terminated in October 1994. Id. Taylor then brought suit under the ADA
alleging that the school district failed to provide her reasonable accommodations for her

mental illness. Id. at 301.
155. Id. at 315.
156. Id. at 315-16.
157. Id. at 317.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 317-18.
160. Id. at 318.
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The Taylor court also listed four factors that an employee with a disability
must demonstrate to show that an employer failed to participate in the interactive
process:
1) the employer knew about the employee's disability; 2) the
employee requested accommodations or assistance for his or her
disability; 3) the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the
employee in seeking accommodations; and 4) the employee could
have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer's lack of
good faith.' 6
In Donahue v. ConsolidatedRail Corp., 62 the Third Circuit clarified its
decision in Taylor regarding whether an employer's failure to engage in good
faith in the interactive process was itself sufficient to defeat summary judgment
and establish an ADA claim. Relying on Taylor, the employee in Donahue
argued that his employer's failure to engage in the interactive process was
sufficient to create an independent cause of action. The court stated that this
reasoning was a misinterpretation of Taylor and held that:
[T]he plaintiff in a disability discrimination case who claims that the
defendant engaged in discrimination by failing to make a reasonable
accommodation cannot recover without showing that a reasonable
accommodation was possible.... [and] 'because employers have a
duty to help the disabled employee devise accommodations, an

employer who acts in bad faith in the interactive process will be liable
ifthe jury can reasonably conclude that the employee would have been
able to perform the job with accommodations." '6 3
Finally, the court in Donahue concluded that when "the summary judgment
record is insufficient to establish the existence of [a reasonable accommodation],
summary judgment must be granted in favor of the [employer]--even if it also
appears that the [employer] failed to engage in good faith in the interactive
process. ' "'

161. Id. at 319-20. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could have
concluded that Taylor had requested accommodations and that the school district made
no effort to help her find accommodations, and it reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for the school district and remanded for trial. Id. at 320.
162. 2000 WL 1160947 (3d Cir. Aug. 17, 2000).
163. Id. at *7 (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 317 (3d
Cir. 1999)).
164. Id. at *6.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION

The Eighth Circuit first filed an opinion in Fellestadon June 16, 1999.265
This opinion was later withdrawn, and the instant decision was substituted in its
place.' 66 Two United States Supreme Court decisions issued subsequent to the
filing of the Eighth Circuit's first opinion necessitated this amendment.' 67
In Fjellestad,the Eighth Circuit considered Fjellestad's challenge to the
grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Pizza Hut, in her
suit brought under Title I of the ADA.' 68 On appeal Fjellestad argued that the
district court erred in holding: "(1) that she was not disabled within the meaning
of the ADA, and (2) that even if she was disabled, she was not a qualified
individual because she failed to articulate a reasonable accommodation that
would make her qualified for the job."' 69170The Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court's opinion and remanded for trial.
A. Disability
In order to qualify as being disabled under the ADA, an individual must
satisfy one of the three prongs under the ADA's definition of disability: (1)
actual disability, (2) record of disability, or (3) regarded as having a disability.'7 '
The Eighth Circuit held that a triable issue of material fact existed as to whether
Fjellestad was
actually disabled under the first prong of the ADA's definition of
72
disability.'
The court stated that an impairment is substantially limiting if it "renders
an individual unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform, or if it significantly restricts the condition,
manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major
life activity as compared to the average person in the general population.' 7' The
court noted three factors that are determinative as to whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity: "(1) the nature and severity of the

165. See Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 182 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 1999).
166. See Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 947, 954 (8th Cir.
1999).
167. Id. at 954; see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding
that an individual's disability must be considered with reference to any mitigating
measure); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (holding same).
168. Fjellestad,188 F.3d at 947.

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 948; see also supranote 68 and accompanying text.

172. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 950 n.3 (8th Cir. 1999).
The court did not address Fjellestad's "regarded as" claim. For a discussion of disability
under the first prong of the ADA definition of disability, see supranote 68.
173. Fjellestad,188 F.3d at 948-49 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii) (1997)).
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impairment; (2) its duration or anticipated duration; and (3) its long-term
impact."' 74 Additionally, the court stated that determinations as to whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a caseby-case basis.'75
The district court rejected Fjellestad's claim that she was substantially
limited in the major life activities of sleeping, bathing, sitting, and working. 76
However, the Eighth Circuit disagreed and held that a triable issue of fact existed
as to whether Fjellestad was substantially limited in the major life activity of
working.' The court explained that to be substantially limited in working, a
person must be "'significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average
person having comparable training, skills, and abilities."" 7 The court listed
several factors that are to be considered: "the number and type of jobs from
which the impaired individual is disqualified; the geographical area to which the
individual has reasonable access; and the individual's job training, experience,
and expectations."' 79 Finally, the court concluded that to find that an individual
is substantially limited in her ability to work "requires a showing that [her]
overall employment opportunities are limited."'8 0 The individual's expertise,
background, and job expectations are all relevant in defining the class of jobs
used to make this determination.' 8 1
The court found four pieces of evidence raised by Fjellestad significant to

create a factual dispute regarding whether her overall employment opportunities

were limited as a result of her medical restrictions. 1 2 First, the court noted that
Fjellestad's entire work training, experience, and expectations lie in restaurant
management, including nearly twenty years of restaurant management
experience working for Pizza Hut." Second, Fjellestad's accident and recovery
had made it impossible for her to work the hours or perform her duties to the
level of success she had previously achieved.' Third, an occupational specialist
had calculated that because of Fjellestad's functional limitations she had
experienced a ninety-one percent reduction in employability and a ninety-five
percent reduction in labor market access based on actual positions available in

174. Id. at 949 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii)(1997)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), cert.

denied, 522 U.S. 1048 (1998)).
179. Id. (citing Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 115 F.3d 613, 617 (8th Cir.
1997); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (1997)).
180. Id. (citing Miller v. City of Springfield, 146 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1998)).
181. Id.

182. Id. at 949-50.
183. Id. at 949.

184. Id.
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her vocational profile.'85 Finally, the court noted that Fjellestad had been unable
to obtain employment following her termination.'86 Given these facts, the Eighth
Circuit held that a triable issue was created as to whether Fjellestad's
impairments had "significantly restricted the condition, manner, or duration in
which she [could] work as compared to an average person in the general
population."' 7
B. Reasonable Accommodation and the InteractiveProcess
In answering the question whether Fjellestad was qualified to perform the
essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodations, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that Fjellestad was required to make a facial showing
that a reasonable accommodation was possible.' Fjellestad argued that two
reasonable accommodations were possible. First, Fjellestad argued that Pizza
Hut could have accommodated her by creating a permanent co-manager
position.8 9 The district court rejected this suggestion, and the Eighth Circuit
agreed concluding that while job restructuring is a possible accommodation
under the ADA, an employer need not reallocate or eliminate the essential
functions of a job to accommodate an employee with a disability, nor is an
employer required to create a new position or a permanent position out of a
temporary one as an accommodation.' 90
However, Fjellestad also contended that Pizza Hut could have
accommodated her by assigning her to the shift manager position that became

185. Id.
186. Id.

187. Id. at 949-50; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(iii) (1997). In light of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Sutton and Murphy, Pizza Hut argued in its supplemental
briefing that Fjellestad was not substantially limited in her ability to work. To support
its position, Pizza Hut relied on the following language in Sutton to contend that

Fjellestad could not be substantially limited in her ability to work unless she was
completely unable to perform any job:

To be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one
must be precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a
particular job of choice. Ifjobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps
not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a
substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are
available, one is not precluded from a broad range ofjobs.
Id. at 954 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,492 (1999)). The court
quickly dismissed this argument stating that "Pizza Hut's interpretation of Sutton would
create an unintended and an absurd result." Id.
188. Id. at 950 (citing Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th
Cir. 1995)).

189. Id.
190. Id.
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vacant when Linda Folkers was promoted to unit manager.'" While the district
court also rejected this suggested accommodation, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that because Fjellestad had competently performed her duties as a unit manager
for close to twenty years, she met her burden of making a facial showing that a
reasonable accommodation was possible."9 Therefore, the court determined that
a genuine issue of material fact was created as to whether Fjellestad was
qualified for the shift manager position and whether moving her to this position
would be a reasonable accommodation. 93
At this point, the Eighth Circuit held that the burden of production should
have shifted to Pizza Hut to produce evidence that it was unable to accommodate
Fjellestad through reassignment to the shift manager position.'94 However,
rather than shifting the burden, the district court summarily dismissed this
suggested accommodation because Fjellestad had previously rejected this
accommodation in her November 15, 1995 grievance letter.195 The court stated
that "the district court's analysis ignored Pizza Hut's obligation under
the ADA
196
to help determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation.
The Eighth Circuit stated that the ADA interpretative guidelines set forth
when it is necessary for an employer to initiate an informal interactive process
with an employee in need of an accommodation. 97 Specifically, an employer
becomes obligated to participate in an interactive process when an individual
with a disability requests an accommodation. 9 Furthermore, the court held that
while "an employer will not be held liable under the ADA for failing to engage
in an interactive process if no reasonable accommodation was possible," for
purposes of summary judgment, "the failure of an employer to engage in an
interactive process to determine whether reasonable accommodations are

191. Id.
192. Id. at 950-51.
193. Id. Under the ADA, reassignment to a vacant position is a possible
accommodation. Id. at 950; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1994); Benson, 62 F.3d
at 1114; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (1997).
194. See Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999)
(citing Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1115 (8th Cir. 1995)).
195. Id. The court later determined that even though Fjellestad's grievance letter
generally rejected demotion as a possible reasonable accommodation, because Pizza Hut
had never discussed accommodation options with her or explained that assignment to a
shift manager position might be the only possible accommodation, and never actually
offered her the shift manager position, Pizza Hut was not relieved of its obligation of
discussing with her the possible accommodations that were appropriate and available.

Id. at 953.
196. Id. at 951.
197. Id. at 952. For a discussion of the interpretative guidelines, see supra Part
III.B. and accompanying notes.
198. jellestad, 188 F.3d at 952.
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possible is prima facie evidence that the employer may be acting in bad faith."'"
The court concluded that under these circumstances, a factual question existed
as to whether Pizza Hut had attempted to provide Fjellestad reasonable
200
accommodation as required by the ADA.
The court then determined that a dispute existed as to whether Pizza Hut
had made a good faith effort to engage in the interactive process, and that a
reasonable jury could conclude that Pizza Hut had not met its burden to engage
in the interactive process to determine whether an appropriate reasonable
accommodation existed. Therefore, the court held that summary judgment was
inappropriate. 201 The court reached this decision by applying the four-factor test
developed by the Third Circuit in Taylor.0 2
The court quickly addressed the first two elements of the Taylor test stating
that "Pizza Hut had more than enough information to put it on notice that
Fjellestad might have a disability,"2 °3 and Fjellestad had specifically requested
a reasonable accommodation in her November 15, 1995 grievance letter to Pizza
Hut.2m Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Fjellestad, the court
concluded that element three of the Taylor test was also satisfied because "a
dispute exists whether Pizza Hut made a good faith effort to engage in the
interactive process, and that a reasonable jury could conclude that Pizza Hut
ha[d] not met its burden to engage in an interactive process to determine whether
an appropriate reasonable accommodation existed."20 The court based its
conclusion on evidence that after Fjellestad had requested a reasonable
accommodation, Pizza Hut placed her on a sixty-day performance plan,
terminated her before the sixty days had expired, and never offered her

199. Id.
200. Id.

201. Id. at 952-54.

202. Id. The Taylor four-factor test is as follows:
1) the employer knew about the employee's disability; 2) the employee
requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disability; 3) the
employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the employee in seeking
accommodations; and 4) the employee could have been reasonably
accommodated but for the employer's lack of good faith.
Id. (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 165 (3d Cir. 1999)). For
a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in Taylor, see supra Part I.D.
203. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999).

Specifically, the court found that Pizza Hut (1)knew that Fjellestad was involved in a car
accident which required her to be hospitalized for nearly one month, (2) had letters from
Fjellestad's doctors containing her various work restrictions and diagnosis, and (3)knew
that Fjellestad had not been performing her job to the level she had for nearly twenty

years prior to her accident. Id.
204. Id.

205. Id.
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reassignment or discussed with her whether other accommodations were
available." 6
Finally, assuming that Pizza Hut failed to act in good faith by engaging in
the interactive process, the court concluded that Pizza Hut had not presented any
evidence that it would have been unable to accommodate Fjellestad by assigning
her to the vacant shift manager position.2"7 The Eighth Circuit further
emphasized that the requirement that employers engage in an interactive process
does not require that any particular accommodation be made by the employer,
but that employers merely "'make a good faith effort to seek
accommodations.""'2 8 Furthermore, the court concluded: "The employee still
carries the burden of showing that a particular accommodation rejected by the
employer would have made the employee qualified to perform the essential
functions of the job."2 9 Hence, in finding that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether Fjellestad was disabled within the meaning of the ADA,
and whether she was qualified to perform the essential functions of the position
with reasonable accommodation, the court reversed the district court's decision
and remanded for trial.2" '
V. COMMENT

In Fjellestad,for the first time, the Eighth Circuit addressed the question
whether employers are required to participate in an interactive process with
employees with disabilities in order to determine if a reasonable accommodation

exists. While the court's decision sides with those circuit courts that require
employer participation in the interactive process, the court's unwillingness to
recognize independent liability for an employer's refusal to engage in the

interactive process is inefficient, unfair, and unreasonable.2"' While at first blush
the court's decision appears sound (i.e., recognizing an affirmative duty to
engage in the interactive process), upon further analysis, the decision may have

unintentionally created the incentive the court was trying to avoid-employers
sitting passively back and knocking down every specific accommodation in posttermination litigation as too burdensome."

206. Id. at 956.

207. Id. at 953.
208. Id. at 954 (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 162 (3d
Cir. 1999)).
209. Id. (citing Taylor, 174 F.3d at 162).

210. Id. at 957.
211. While explicitly stating that "there is no per se liability under the ADA if an
employer fails to engage in an interactive process," the court's decision does avoid the
uncertainty experienced by other circuits on this issue. Id. at 952. However, the Eighth
Circuit offered no reason as to why it was adopting this position.
212. Id. at 953.
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A. Information Asymmetries, Incentives, and Inefficiencies
Both the EEOC regulations and court decisions appropriately recognize that
information asymmetries exist between the employer and employee.
Particularly, employers are likely to have an information advantage in at least
two important areas necessary for employees to establish a prima facie claim:
the essential requirements of the particular job the employee desires, and what
accommodations are likely to impose an undue hardship on the employer.23
Likewise, employees possess information about their particular medical
conditions and inherent limitations which are possibly unknown to employers.
Therefore, through the requirement that employees and employers engage in a
flexible interactive process, both parties are able to break through these
information barriers and determine if an accommodation exists in an efficient
manner. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit was prudent to follow the lead of the
circuit courts that have held that employers have a duty to engage in an
interactive process with their employees with disabilities. However, the
incentive the Eighth Circuit created for employers to fulfill this "duty," namely,
the preclusion of summary judgment, is both unfair and inefficient.
Only the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that circumstances may exist
when an employer is obligated to both initiate and participate in the interactive
process." 4 Consequently, it is the employee's responsibility to initiate the
process by notifying his employer that he has a disability and requesting that he
be accommodated. Therefore, regardless of whether an employee's disability
could have been reasonably accommodated, absent notification of a disability
and a request for accommodation, the employer's duty to engage in the
interactive process never arises, and an employee will always lose on summary
judgment. Likewise, if the employee does provide notification and requests
accommodation, but nevertheless fails to interact in good faith with the
employer, the employee once again will automatically lose on summary
judgment. Thus, the employee is given a sufficient incentive to disclose
information he uniquely possesses, because his failure to do so results in the
dismissal of his claim.
However, if an employer fails to fulfill its "duty," once triggered by an
employee's notification of disability and request for accommodation, under the
Eighth Circuit's analysis, the employer does not automatically lose, but rather
is only precluded from winning on summary judgment.215 This result, unequal
213. In the Seventh Circuit, the employee bears the burden of proving that he is an
"otherwise qualified individual." This proof involves a two-step inquiry: (1) the
employee must demonstrate that he satisfied the prerequisites for the position, and (2) the
employee must show that he could perform the essential functions of the job with or
without reasonable accommodation. See Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100
F.3d 1281, 1284 (7th Cir. 1996).
214. See supra note 143.
215. While the actual employer costs associated with communicating with an
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consequences for each party's "breach of duty," is unfair. More importantly
however, this result creates a perverse incentive for an employer to withhold
information that it uniquely possesses, because even if an employer does not
participate in the interactive process, it can still prevail if the employee is unable
to show that a particular accommodation was possible. Thus, with no liability
for failure to participate in the interactive process, the employer has an incentive
to withhold information the employee needs to meet his burden. Particularly,
this situation will arise in those circumstances where the employer possesses
information that is both unknown to the employee and necessary to prove the
possibility of a reasonable accommodation.
Under the facts of Fjellestad,the Eighth Circuit concluded that Fjellestad
had created a factual question as to whether she was qualified to perform the
essential functions of the shift manager position vacated by Folkers. In this case,
Fjellestad had knowledge of the opening because Folkers was promoted to fill
Fjellestad's unit manager position. However, if Fjellestad did not have this
information, Pizza Hut could have withheld the information that Fjellestad
needed to satisfy her burden and would have been able to "passively sit back,"
confident that it would not be found liable for failure to interact. Consequently,
when information asymmetries exist between two parties to a transaction, absent
strict liability for failure to disclose, the parties will always have an incentive to
withhold information. In one sense, the Eighth Circuit's decision imposes strict
liability on employees for breach of their duty, but it imposes no reciprocal
liability on employers. Hence, while employees have the proper incentive to
disclose information and engage in the interactive process in good faith, the
Eighth Circuit's decision does not create the same incentive for employers.
In Jackan v. New York State DepartmentofLabor,1 6 the Second Circuit
stated that the concern over an employer's greater access to information
combined with the employee's burden of proof requirements is over-stated. In
making this conclusion the Second Circuit stated: "Once the litigation has
begun, the plaintiff can utilize the liberal discovery procedures of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, including interrogatories, depositions, and document
demands ...
27 However, this reasoning is flawed because it fails to take into
consideration the inefficiencies created by such a framework. Relying on the
litigation alternative (the most expensive and resource intensive form of dispute

employee with a disability are probably marginal, employers may have other incentives
for not engaging in an interactive process with employees with disabilities. Employers
may fear that preferential treatment given to employees with disabilities (often disabilities
that are unknown to co-workers) will have an adverse affect on co-worker morale. See
Lisa E. Key, Co-Worker Morale, Confidentiality,and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 1003 (1997). Employers also may fear that communications
with employees with disabilities will create a precedent whereby other workers will
demand accommodations such as, flexible working hours or on-sight day care.
216. 205 F.3d 562 (2d Cir. 2000).
217. Id. at 568 n.4.
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resolution), as the method whereby employees are able to discover information
possessed by their employers, rather than employing the simple interactive
prqcess envisioned by the EEOC guidelines is terribly inefficient. Not only does
this framework waste society's scarce resources, but because employees with
disabilities are likely to be at a significant financial disadvantage as compared
to their employers, the decision is also likely to deter plaintiffs from pursuing
valid claims of discrimination.
B. Alternative Frameworks
One possible solution to the incentive and efficiency problems created by
the Eighth Circuit's framework would be to create a mandatory inference of
discrimination when an employee prevails on proof of failure to engage in good
faith in the interactive process. Such a framework would not only be fair in that
it would carry the same consequences for failure to interact for both the
employer and employee, but it would provide employers with the proper
incentive to communicate with their employees to determine whether a
reasonable accommodation exists in the most efficient manner possible. This
solution is somewhat analogous to the position Congress took in evaluating a
"mixed-motive" case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
In a "mixed-motive" case, the employer's decision for its adverse action is
based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations. In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,"' the Supreme Court held that Title VII requires
employees to prove that the employer relied on an impermissible factor in
reaching its employment decision and that an employer shall not be liable if it
can prove that, even if it had not taken the impermissible factor into account, it
would have reached the same employment decision regarding the employee.2 19
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 modified the Supreme Court's holding in Price
Waterhouse as to when a plaintiff is entitled to relief in a "mixed-motive" case.
As amended, Title VII now provides that a plaintiff establishes an unlawful
employment practice "when [she] demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even

though other factors also motivated the practice." 2 However, if an employer

218. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins's proposed
partnership was held up for consideration for one year and subsequently refused to be reproposed. Id. at 231-32. Hopkins filed suit under Title VII alleging sex discrimination.
Id. at 232. Hopkins had direct evidence of discrimination which included being told that
to improve her chances for partnership she should "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry." Id. at 235. In addition to evidence of showing direct discrimination, there was
also evidence that the employer had a nondiscriminatory reason for denying Hopkins's
promotion. Id. at 234-35.
219. Id. at 241-43.
220. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). This provision was added by the Civil Rights
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/4
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is able to establish that the same action would have been taken in the absence of
the illegitimate motive, the court is limited in the types of relief that it may
order." Thus, in the context of the interactive process, when an employer has
an affirmative duty to participate in the process, failure to do so-regardless of
whether the employer would have taken the same action if it had engaged in the
process-is illegitimate behavior, and therefore should entitle the employee to
at least minimum relief.
An alternative solution to independent liability for failure to engage in the
interactive process would be to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer
upon a showing of failure to engage in good faith in the interactive process.
Under the court's current framework, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains
at all times on the employee.tm Specifically, the employee has the burden of
showing that a particular accommodation rejected by the employer would have
made the employee qualified to perform the essential functions of the job. This

framework is unfair when employers possess information that the employee
requires to satisfy her burden of proof. Thus, in those instances where an
employer is found to have failed to satisfy its duty regarding the interactive
process, it is logical to shift the burden and require the employer to persuade the
jury that the employee's proposed accommodation would not have made the
employee qualified. Shifting the burden in this manner creates an alternative
framework that provides employers with an incentive to fulfill their duty to
participate in good faith in the interactive process.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ADA was a historic piece of legislation intending to "mandate" the
elimination of discrimination experienced by Americans with disabilities.
Unfortunately, implementing the statute has not been easy. Establishing the
bilateral obligations of employees and employers in the search for a reasonable
accommodation and assigning liability when the process breaks down has left
the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals perplexed. The Eighth Circuit's decision
in Fjellestadprovides clear guidance to both employers and employees. For
employers, there is a duty to engage in an interactive process with your
employees with disabilities in order to determine if a reasonable accommodation
exists. For employees, a failure of your employer to engage in the interactive
process is not sufficient to establish an ADA claim. While generally in line with
the EEOC guidelines, when information asymmetries exist between the
employer and employee, the court's decision leaves employees with an unfair
burden of proof, employers with an incentive to derail employees' claims, and

Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).
221. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071,
1075-76 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (1994)).
222. See Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 957 (8th Cir. 1999).
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society footing the bill. The Supreme Court will eventually be called on to sort
out the confusion. The Court must be careful and not inadvertently create a
disincentive for employers to interact with their employees with disabilities to
find a reasonable accommodation. To do so would clearly undermine the
purpose of the ADA. Unfortunately, that is what the Eighth Circuit's decision
in Fjellestadmay just have done.
JILL S. KINGSBURY
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